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Beyond Human Rights: The Legal Status of the Individual in International Law1 is a translation 
by Jonathan Huston, revised and updated by the author, Anne Peters, of the 2013 monograph 
entitled Jenseits der Menschenrechte: Die Rechtstellung des Individuum sim Völkerrecht.2 A 
valuable and extensive analysis is provided on the rise in prominence of the individual in 
International Criminal Law, the Law of Armed Conflict, the Responsibility to Protect doctrine 
(R2P), law regulating humanitarian assistance, Investment Law, Consular Law and Diplomatic 
protection. 
The book claims that the individual has international legal personality, defined as ‘the 
capacity to be a holder of international rights and duties’.3 However, the central proposition is 
that the ‘massive increase … in the practice and opinio juris of acknowledging rights and duties 
on a large scale has … crystallised … an original (primary) international legal personality of 
the human being’.4 Treaty provisions, customary international law, general principles of law 
under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice5 (ICJ Statute) all indicate 
the original personality of the individual, unassailable and untouchable by the traditionally 
accepted central subject of international law: the state.6 Further, Article 6 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and Article 16(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, stating that ‘[e]veryone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person 
before the law’, confer international individual personality.7 This new international legal status 
is an expression of a normative individualism: ‘politics and law ultimately should be guided 
and justified by the concerns of the persons affected by them’.8 
Peters’ argument is convincing in relation to individuals having capacity to bear rights 
and duties. However, the claim that the empirical study demonstrates original international legal 
personality, and that all of the doctrinal chapters represent a strengthening of the position of the 
                                                 
1 Anne Peters, Beyond Human Rights: The Legal Status of the Individual in International Law (translated by 
Jonathan Huston) (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
2 Anne Peters, Jenseits der Menschenrechte: Die Rechtstellung des Individuum sim Völkerrecht (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2014).  
3 Peters (n 1) 2, 32, 50.  
4 Peters (n 1) 551 [emphasis added].  
5 Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945).  
6 Peters (n 1) 551. 
7 Peters (n 1) 551.  
8 Peters (n 1) 553. 
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individual in international law, may be challenged. This review is divided into two sections 
addressing these two points.9 The first section questions the assertion of original (primary) 
international legal personality of the individual: that there is evidence that international 
individual legal personality is not dependent upon state consent and to demonstrate instances 
of where the individual possesses law-creating power.10 The argument here is that Peters, first, 
predominantly recognises that non-state actors fall short of law-making capabilities; second, 
that the example of law-making capacity in Tadić does not withstand scrutiny;11 and further, 
the claim that international courts ‘consolidate’ individual international personality is not fully 
made out. The second section of this review addresses one of the chapters that purportedly 
evidences a strengthening of individual legal personality: Chapter 8 addressing the development 
of the R2P doctrine. I argue that the doctrine of R2P does not in principle or practice illustrate 
prioritisation of the individual over states in international law.  
 
Individual Legal Personality as Independent from the State 
 
In order to support Peters’ proposition that there exists original international legal status, the 
international legal personality of the individual cannot be dependent upon state consensus and 
states cannot be the only actors with the capacity to create international law.12 Original legal 
personality of the individual is usually denied on the grounds that only states can grant—or set 
aside—individual legal status, most obviously in relation to treaty-making but also through 
individual rights conferred under customary international law, which can ‘fall desuetude 
pursuant to state practice’.13 Positive international law needs to be generated by ‘direct’ 
democratic procedures without mediation by states, created directly by non-state actors. 
For Peters, although transnationally operating businesses, arbitral tribunals, non-
governmental organisations and certain international organisations can participate in discourse 
relating to norm creation, they are still not empowered to create binding norms of international 
                                                 
9 For a fuller overview of the layout and content of the book, see Andreas Th Müller, ‘Anne Peters, Jenseits der 
Menschenrechte: Die Rechtstellung des Individuum sim Völkerrecht (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014)’ (2015) 
26(1) European Journal of International Law 295. 
10 Ibid 434.  
11 International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY), Case No IT-94-1-AR72, Prosecutor v Duško Tadić, 
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber of 2 October 1995. 
12 Peters (n 1) 434.  
13 Peters (n 1) 409. 
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law.14 She cites the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals Chamber in 
Tadić as stating that the behaviour of insurgents contributes to the formation of new rules in the 
law of armed conflict15 as support for the proposition that non-state actors can potentially 
participate in law creation through their behaviour. However, this is a misconstruction of Tadić 
insofar as the Appeals Chamber merely recognised the lack of rules and regulation on non-state 
actor activity in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). Only Common Article 3 to the 
Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol II regulated NIACs prior to Tadić. Tadić 
expanded rules applicable to NIACs by analogy to rules concerning international armed conflict 
(IAC), justifying the application of rules traditionally regulating IACs to the context of 
insurgencies in order to facilitate the development of international criminal law and prosecution 
of non-state actors: 
 
Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban rape, torture or the wanton destruction 
of hospitals, churches, museums or private property, as well as proscribe weapons causing 
unnecessary suffering when two sovereign states are engaged in war, and yet refrain from 
enacting the same bans or providing the same protection when armed violence has erupted 
‘only’ within the territory of a sovereign State?16 
 
The Appeals Chamber did not endorse the view that insurgents could create law but that the 
activity of non-state actors should come within the jurisdiction of the ICTY to facilitate their 
prosecution. The non-state actors would have argued that this development was in 
contravention of the principle of nullem crimen sine lege and would not have perceived it as an 
endowment of law-making powers.  
The development of international law by international courts has strengthened and 
expanded rights, ‘consolidat[ing]’ individual international personality, according to Peters.17 
While it is true that international judges and arbitrators enjoy judicial independence and this 
means that the development of law occurs without direct state control, this does not necessarily 
provide an indication of individual international legal personality. A sufficient connection is 
not made between the individual bringing the complaint who wishes to influence global 
governance—insofar as it affects them—through instigating proceedings at an international 
court, and the decision made by the international judge to perhaps grant or not grant the 
                                                 
14 Peters (n 1) 545. 
15 Peters (n 1) 547 citing Tadić (n 11) [108]: ‘In addition to the behaviour of belligerent States, Governments and 
insurgents, other factors have been instrumental in bringing about the formation of customary rules at issue.’  
16 Prosecutor v Tadić (Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) [97]. 
17 Peters (n 1) 549. 
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individual’s wishes. An international judge who makes a decision in adversarial proceedings 
on the application of law to a given set of circumstances is not the same as the individual 
participating in law-making processes. While international judicial proceedings may facilitate 
individual participation in producing international law and increasing democratic 
accountability,18 that connection is not explicitly made here by Peters. Unconsidered are 
arguments as to whether international courts have law-making capacity at all, and debates on 
their legitimacy as law-making bodies as a minority of elites. Further discussion may have 
helped explain how they potentially facilitate original individual legal personality. 
After stating that international court decisions consolidate individual legal personality, 
Peters concedes that court judgments are no substitute for democratic international law-making. 
In particular, courts only provide ex post accountability and not anticipatory accountability.19 
What is required is a dual democracy, individual participation through domestic democratic 
participation procedures and direct individual participation in global governance, for original 
individual international legal personality to exist.20 Peters’ conclusion that individuals are 
‘halfway between ownership of rights and capacity to make law’ is not synonymous with 
original international legal personality.21 
A separate, but overlapping, argument posited is that courts provide an independent 
source of individual legal personality as interpreting bodies increasingly move away from 
reliance on the original intent of state drafters of the treaty and towards implicit protection of 
the individual.22 While Müller welcomes Peters’ focus on ‘individual rights’ as distinct from 
‘human rights’,23 the latter would have helped the development of the argument on how courts 
have, or have not, contributed to the crystallisation of individual legal personality. The 
International Court of Justice decision in the La Grande Case24 may represent an instance of 
where courts used their interpretation powers to prioritise the individual, but what of the 
voluminous human rights jurisprudence, including non-human rights courts, taking into account 
                                                 
18 See further, Jane M Rooney, ‘The Paradox of Extraterritoriality at the European Court of Human Rights: A 
Global Constitutionalist Approach’ (Doctoral Thesis, 2016) available at http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/11888/ (last 
accessed 17 May 2018). 
19 Peters (n 1) 550. See MacDonald and MacDonald who argue that ex post accountability can suffice as a form 
of democratic accountability: Terry MacDonald and Kate MacDonald, ‘Non-Electoral Accountability in Global 
Politics: Strengthening Democratic Control within the Global Garment Industry’ (2006) 17(1) European Journal 
of International Law 89.  
20 Peters (n 1) 550.  
21 Peters (n 1) 551. 
22 Peters (n 1) 414–15. 
23 Müller (n 9) 295. 
24 La Grande (Germany v Italy) (2001) ICJ 466. 
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human rights: will this body of jurisprudence not have a bearing on whether there is a visible 
normative shift towards the individual in international law, and whether the individual is 
prioritised over the state? 
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that ‘any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ must be taken 
into account in the interpretation of treaties.25 In this context, courts overseeing compliance and 
enforcement of their respective constitutive treaties may take into account human rights in their 
interpretation of the requirements of those provisions. For example, the Kadi decision of the 
European Court of Justice on 18 July 2013 and the Nada v Switzerland decision of the European 
Court of Human Rights in September 2013, both gave preference to human rights standards 
over UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions under the UNSCR 1267 (1999) sanctions 
regime.26 The outcome of those decisions provides strong evidence of the prioritisation of the 
individual that would give great credence to the ambitious thesis put forward by Peters. In 
contrast, the European Court of Human Rights in Jones v United Kingdom upheld the immunity 
of Saudi Arabian state officials accused of torture, pursuant to the International Court of 
Justice’s Jurisdictional Immunities judgment which clearly accepted prioritisation of state 
immunity over the jus cogens norm.27 These decisions on fundamental human rights norms 
versus state immunity should have been included in the context of a thesis on the new normative 
shift of prioritisation of individual over the state, and would have tempered the normative 
appraisal. Consideration of the effect of human rights on other international law norms and vice 
versa may have also served to paint a more accurate picture of whether it is true that 
international law obligations are increasingly oriented towards the individual to substantive 
claims of crystallisation of original individual legal personality independent of the state.  
International human rights courts often defer to states in establishing the content of 
rights, indicating prioritisation of the state over the individual. For example, the ‘margin of 
appreciation’ in the European context has led to blanket bans on the burqa,28 a conception of 
reproductive rights that prioritises domestic consensus over European and international 
                                                 
25 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted on 23 May 1969, entered into force on 27 January 1980). 
26 European Commission & the Council of the European Union v Yassin Abdullah Kadi, joined Cases C-584/10 
P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P [2013] ECR; Nada v Switzerland, Application no 10593/08 (ECtHR, 12 September 
2012). See further, Erika de Wet, ‘From Kadi To Nada: Judicial Techniques Favoring Human Rights Over United 
Nations Security Council Sanctions’ (2013) 12(4) Chinese Journal of International Law 787. 
27 Jones v United Kingdom (2014) 59 EHRR 1; Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece 
intervening) (Judgment) (International Court of Justice, General List No 143, 3 February 2012).   
28 SAS v France [2014] ECHR 695. 
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consensus,29 and the killing of 800 civilians who were hostage to Chechen terrorists as a 
proportionate use of force by the Russian state,30 to name a few instances of where the state is 
prioritised over the individual. Judges do not necessarily find in favour of the interests of the 
individual as the more powerful state actors can be determinative of the very existence of the 
international organisation for which they adjudicate. Human rights jurisprudence is 
unavoidably illuminating in deciding whether there is an emerging original international legal 
personality, and there are many indications that the state is prioritised over the individual in this 
context. 
 
Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute stipulates that in order to qualify as a general principle of 
international law, the principle needs to be widespread in domestic law and transposable to the 
international level.31 Peters contends that there is universal recognition of legal personality of 
the individual in private law: all individuals can contract, buy property, make wills, etc. 
However, she neglects that some private law transactions are not available to all individuals, 
not even in liberal-thinking, western democratic societies. One example is the private 
transaction of marriage which creates rights and obligations between spouses. In Northern 
Ireland, in the United Kingdom, same-sex marriage is prohibited and the marriage of a same-
sex couple in a different jurisdiction will not be acknowledged as their legitimate legal status 
in Northern Ireland for the purpose of pursuing further private transactions.32 The state decides 
who can engage in this private transaction and from whom private rights and obligations can 
ensue, which does not point to recognition of original individual legal personality. It is not 
apparent that there exists under Article 38(1) ICJ Statute a widespread recognition of domestic 
original individual legal personality. 
Ultimately, the book leaves us less than certain that non-state actors are close to 
establishing an ability to create law or that there has been a ‘massive increase … in the practice 
and opinio juris of acknowledging rights and duties on a large scale’ which has then 
‘crystallised … an original (primary) international legal personality of the human being’.33 
 
                                                 
29 A B C v Ireland (2011) 53 EHRR 13. 
30 Tagayeva v Russia, Application no 26562/07 (ECtHR, First Section 13 April 2017). 
31 Peters (n 1) 421. 
32 In Re X [2017] NIFam 12, 17 August 2017. 
33 Peters (n 1) 551 [emphasis added].  
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Responsibility to Protect 
 
While Müller commends the careful distinctions drawn between lex lata and lex ferenda by 
Peters, they should be viewed with greater suspicion in the context of the broader argument of 
the book which is that the empirical and doctrinal chapters evidence the crystallisation of a 
customary international norm of an international individual right. One chapter which deals with 
lex ferenda is Chapter 8 on R2P and humanitarian assistance. Here I argue that the doctrine of 
R2P does not in principle or practice provide evidence of prioritisation of the individual over 
states in international law. 
 
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is defined in the UN General Assembly World 
Summit Outcome Document34 as requiring that ‘[e]ach individual State … protect its 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’.35 States 
must take ‘collective action … through the [UN Security Council (UNSC)], in accordance with 
the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis … should peaceful means be 
inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations’.36 Peters 
is an advocate of R2P, and recognises the normative desirability of a shift from the state right 
to intervene towards a possible obligation to intervene, and from non-intervention towards non-
indifference to mass crimes37 and a ‘victim-centric’ approach. State sovereignty must only be 
justifiable as an instrument to protect human beings. A state’s own sovereignty is contingent 
upon its responsibility towards the inhabitants of its territory. If a territorial state is ‘unwilling 
or unable’ to honour this responsibility,38 it temporarily forfeits its territorial integrity and 
therefore protection against third party intervention.39 Peters specifies that R2P should entail a 
procedural obligation to justify non-intervention, especially an obligation for the permanent 
members of the UNSC to justify veto.40  
                                                 
34 United Nations General Assembly World Summit Outcome Document 2005, UN Doc RES/60/1, paras 138–
40.  
35 Ibid para 138.  
36 Ibid para 139.  
37 Peters (n 1) 237. 
38 Peters (n 1). See further, ‘Responsibility to Protect’, United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the 
Responsibility to Protect, available at: www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.html  
(last accessed 17 May 2018).  
39 Ibid 237. 
40 Ibid 240. 
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Whether or not R2P can be justified on the grounds that it is ‘victim-centric’ and 
prioritises the needs of the individual over state sovereignty itself is debatable. The ‘unwilling 
or unable’ doctrine, a central justification for state military intervention under R2P, was used 
by the Obama administration to expand the scope of the application of the right to self-defence 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter, stating that: 
 
ISIL and other terrorist groups in Syria are a threat not only to Iraq, but also to many other 
countries, including the United States ... 
 
States must be able to defend themselves, in accordance with the inherent right of individual 
and collective self-defense, … when, … the government of the State where the threat is located 
is unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its territory for such attacks.  
 
The Syrian regime has shown that it cannot and will not confront these safe-havens effectively 
itself. Accordingly, the United States has initiated necessary and proportionate military actions 
in Syria in order to eliminate the ongoing ISIL threat to Iraq, including by protecting Iraqi 
citizens from further attacks and by enabling Iraqi forces to regain control of Iraq’s borders.41 
 
In other words, as the Syrian Government was ‘unwilling or unable’ to protect its own people 
and nationals of other states from the threat of ISIS, this was justification for multinational 
forces to resort to military intervention in Syria. This was without UNSC approval. In this 
context, Ntina Tzouvala argues that the ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine ‘reintroduces a hierarchy 
of states in the operation of jus ad bellum’ whereby states’ rights and duties are tailored 
accordingly.42 This is reminiscent of the ‘infamous nineteenth-century distinction between 
civilised, semi-civilised and uncivilised states … civilised states enjoyed full international legal 
personality, while uncivilised states were just objects … of international law’.43 This 
‘unapologetically’ challenges the notion of sovereign equality—that all states are sovereign and 
equal.44 Therefore, rather than orienting the international legal system towards the interest of 
individuals, R2P in adopting the doctrine of ‘unwilling or unable’—which justifies third party 
intervention and undermining of state sovereignty— facilitates the use of force by powerful 
actors by providing a legal basis to take action against other, destabilised states. This is not so 
                                                 
41 Samantha Power, Letter written on 23 September 2014 to Mr Ban Ki Moon, Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. 
42 Ntina Tzouvala, ‘TWAIL and the “Unwilling or Unable” Doctrine, Continuities, and Ruptures’ (2016) 109 
American Journal of International Law Unbound 266. 
43 Ibid, citing James Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations: A Treaties of the Jural Relations of Separate 
Political Communities (London, William Blackwood and Sons, 1883).  
44 Ibid. 
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much a shift towards the individual as victim, as a consolidation of the political power of strong 
states against other weaker states. 
That foreign military intervention leads to less human loss or atrocity is not inevitable. 
Peters recognises that the UNSC-mandated NATO intervention in Libya ‘did not improve the 
situation of the population’.45 NATO admitted to a number of fatal mistakes during its 9,65846 
strike sorties in Libya, including one on 19 June 2011 in Tripoli that lead to civilian deaths.47 
While the number of deaths resulting from the NATO bombardment of Libya is contested, 
modest estimations are that 60 civilians were killed and 55 wounded,48 while others place the 
numbers into the thousands, arguing that NATO provided indispensable support for atrocities 
committed by insurgents.49 
The fixation on R2P as ‘military intervention’ rather than consideration of the other two 
tenets of R2P—prevent and rebuild50—calls into question the real motives of foreign states that 
decide to intervene in territories where populations, and often the government, are vulnerable. 
This is evidenced in relation to the intervention in Libya. Amnesty International reported that 
EU Member States did ‘not adequately respond … to the unfolding human tragedy by assisting 
those fleeing conflict and persecution in Libya to reach safety’ despite backing the NATO 
campaign in Libya, and the declared raison d’être as being the protection of civilians.51 In 2017, 
the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) recorded 1,073 people dead or missing in that year alone 
on the treacherous passage between Libya and Italy.52 Some reports estimate that the UK spent 
13 times more on the NATO bombardment than on post-conflict rebuilding.53 
                                                 
45 Peters (n 1) 6.  
46 ‘Counting the Cost of NATO’s Mission in Libya’ BBC Online (31 October 2011), available at 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15528984 (last accessed 17 May 2018). 
47 NATO, ‘NATO Acknowledges Civilian Casualties in Tripoli’ (NATO, 19 June 2011), available at: 
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_75639.htm (last accessed 18 May 2018). 
48 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, UN Human Rights Council 19th Session, 
A/HRC/19/68.  
49 Seumas Milne, ‘If the Libyan War Was About Saving Lives, it was a Catastrophic Failure’ The Guardian (26 
October 2011), available at www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/oct/26/libya-war-saving-lives-
catastrophic-failure (last accessed 18 May 2018). 
50 See, eg, Sandra Fabijanić Gagro, ‘The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Doctrine’ (2014) 3(1) International 
Journal of Social Sciences 61. 
51 Amnesty International, ‘The Battle for Libya: Killings, Disappearances and Torture’ (Amnesty International, 
2011) 87–88. 
52 Lizzie Dearden, ‘Refugee Death Toll Passes 1,600 in Record 2017 as Charities Attacked for Conducting 
Mediterranean Rescues’ Independent (22 April 2017), available at: 
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-migrants-asylum-seekers-mediterranean-see-libya-
italy-ngos-smugglers-accusations-a7696976.html (last accessed 18 May 2018). 
53 Jody Harrison, ‘UK Government Spent 13 Times more Bombing Libya than on Rebuilding Post War’ Herald 
Scotland (26 July 2015), available at 
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R2P is not sufficiently defined to be practicable or to prevent against the blurring of the 
line between legitimate motives of protection of a population and opportunistic intervention by 
third party states. While Peters prescribes that the UNSC has the status of guarantor, the 
‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine is being used to justify intervention without UNSC approval.54 
Peters may acknowledge that ‘the codification or recognition of a direct and transboundary 
international individual right to protection … could easily be abused as an excuse for 
intervention and could in practice hardly or only selectively be enforced’, but it is unclear why 
she does not recognise these difficulties in the concept of R2P as it is currently understood.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The assertion that ‘individuals take precedence over states as subjects of international law 
cannot be justified on the basis of international law as it currently exists’.55 While many of the 
developments evidenced by Peters may on their face indicate the strengthening of the position 
of the individual in international law, the inherent remaining weakness of the individual vis-à-
vis the state should be considered when asking whether a normative shift has occurred. 
Global governance has shifted once again since the publication of the translation of the 
original monograph. Burundi is the first state to leave the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
amongst numerous threats of withdrawal,56 whilst contemporaneously the crime of aggression 
will come into force in December 2017 which may see more Western state leaders being 
prosecuted—or maybe not. ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, has requested the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to authorise an investigation into allegations of war crimes committed by the UK and 
US in Afghanistan. The European Union (EU) has lost the membership of the UK, and 
remaining in, or leaving, the EU forms part of electoral manifestos of parties in Member States 
across Europe. This signifies an abrupt reassertion of the state in Europe. In the UK, it signals 
revocation of individual rights through the disabling of the principle of direct effect of EU law 
enshrined under section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972. This was pointed out in 
                                                 
www.heraldscotland.com/news/13499912.UK_government_spent_13_times_more_bombing_
Libya_than_on_rebuilding_post_war/ (last accessed 18 May 2018).  
54 Peters (n 1) 248. 
55 Müller (n 9) 248. 
56 Gambia and South Africa have revoked their declarations of withdrawal from the ICC. 
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Miller which insisted upon parliamentary intervention for the triggering of Article 50 of the 
Treaty of the European Union rather than through the prerogative, as withdrawal entailed 
depriving UK citizens of fundamental rights.57 The status of the individual remains 
unpredictable rather than entrenched in international law. Whilst some specialist legal regimes 
have embraced the individual as a subject or potential subject, powerful state and non-state 
actors provide constant reminders of their vulnerability as active participants in global 
governance, which undermines the assertion of a normative shift towards prioritisation of the 
individual. 
 
Jane M Rooney 
University of Bristol Law School 
 
                                                 
57 R (on the application of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5  [69]–
[73]. 
